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Abstract: I estimate the fuel retailer cartel damages in the south of Brazil using reduced and 
structural forms for supply and demand. Brazilian Competition Authority (CADE) documents 
help to characterize the ethanol and gasoline retailers involved in the collusion. The objective is 
to evaluate competition policy by comparing the amount of estimated damages with the amount of 
applied fines. This paper also adds an important result to gasoline substitution, as data shows 
that ethanol is perceived as a perfect substitute and it is price inelastic. Results show an 
overcharge of 4.6% to 6.6% in the gasoline market and up to 12% in the ethanol market during 
collusion. Fines should consider the deterrence effect and, giving the low probability of detection, 
CADE’s applied fines seemed to be in line with this objective. 
 
Resumo: Este trabalho estima os danos causados pelo cartel nos postos de gasolina na regiao 
sul do Brasil usando tanto uma equacao reduzida quanto um modelo estrutural de demanda e 
oferta. Documentos do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Economica (CADE) ajudam a 
caracterizar os postos envolvidos na colusao nos mercados de etanol e gasolina. O objetivo é 
avaliar os efeitos da politica de concorrencia comparando o montante do dano estimado com as 
multas aplicadas.Em adicional, esse trabalho tambem contribui para a literatura sobre 
substituicao de gasolina, uma vez que os dados apontam que o etanol é percebido como 
substituto perfeito e é preco inelastico. Os resultados mostram que houve um sobrecusto causado 
pelo cartel de ordem de 4.6% a 6.6% no mercado de gasolina e de ate 12% no mercado de 
etanol. As multas aplicadas, contudo, devem considerar a probabilidade de o cartel ser 
descoberto e, dada sua baixa probabilidade, as multas aplicadas no presente caso parecem estar 
alinhadas com esse objetivo.   
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I. Introduction 
Increasingly, Competition Authorities (CAs) around the world are quantifying the aggregate benefits 
of their activities as an impact assessment. In 2016, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) launched a reference guide on ex-post evaluation of CAs’ enforcement decisions. 
Those assessments are of growing interest since they demonstrate the ‘value for money’ of this public 
policy.  In this article I estimate the fuel retailer cartel damages in the south region of Brazil to compare 
with the amount of fines imposed by the Brazilian Competition Authority (CADE). As other 
jurisdictions, cartels are illegal in the country, being the participants subject to administrative and 
criminal investigations2. Antitrust law determines that fines may be no less than the amount of harm 
resulting from the conduct. However, CADE has seldom resorted to this provision when determining 
fines; when done, the amount imposed was less than the equivalent of the maximum percentage of the 
defendant’s turnover allowed by the law3.  
Investigation on antitrust violations in the fuel sectors have been a thorn in the side of most CAs’ 
around the world4. Although there is an understanding that fuels price volatility can be a result of other 
factors – i.e. demand or cost shocks, pricing strategies (ex. Clark and Houde, 2013, 2014)  – the lack of 
comprehension from general public may raise doubts on how efficient CAs enforce the antitrust law. In 
the Brazilian experience, the amount of complaints in the fuel retail sector takes almost 1/4 of the 
workload of CADE. From 2005 to 2010, the institution received an average of 200 complaints per year 
 
2 Article 36 of Law 12,529/11 sets forth the basic framework for anticompetitive conduct in Brazil. Criminal cartel investigations are responsibility of the 
Federal Prosecution Bureau and ruled by the Supreme Court.   
3 Antitrust Law determines fines against the companies may range from 0.1 to 20 % of the company’s or group of companies’ pre-tax turnover in the 
economic sector affected by the conduct, in the year prior to the beginning of the investigation. This has been used as a rule of thumb by CADE’s Tribunal 
due to the difficulties in harm estimation. 
4 OECD (2013). 
only in this sector. However, the authority has condemned only 15 unions and fuel retailers’ in different 
municipalities until 2015 because of lack of direct proof.  
This work is related to two strands of literature: demand estimation for ethanol and its substitutability 
for gasoline and cartel damage estimation. Anderson (2012) claims to be the first to provide estimates 
for ethanol elasticity and it is very sensitive to relative prices. This paper contributes to this finding, 
since cartelists pricing strategy required not only a raise in gasoline price but also a drop in ethanol price 
in order to keep relative prices within a margin equivalent to fuel performance and stations distance to 
the city center. It also innovates with a database from the Brazilian ethanol market, the most 
consolidated flex fuel vehicles commercialization in the world5.   
The literature on damage estimation is quite available since private claims started to be implemented 
both in the US and in Europe. Ashurst (2004) was the first one to compile a cartel damage quantification 
study for the EC, giving a structured overview of the court decisions at the time of examination. Connor 
(2009) examined the antitrust litigation of the lysine cartel rather intensively and points to quantification 
problems as he emphasizes that the before and after method is rather critical in cases in which cartel 
formation took place after a recession and under such circumstances the benchmark might be 
understated and damages overstated, et vice versa. Dijk and Verboven (2007) also distinguish between 
damage quantification methods that use comparator indicators and methods that are based on direct 
information about the cartelized market. They also introduce critical loss analysis: by determining the 
break-even point at which demand decreases given a particular price increase and comparing this to the 
expected actual loss, cartel price overcharges were calculated.  
The discussion about the deterrence effect of cartel fines is also a wide-raging scientific area that is 
directly related to the actual research. Various studies come to the conclusion that the deterring effects of 
 
5 By 2007, when the cartel was in place, 69% of total passenger vehicles in Brazil were flex-fuel (ANFAVEA 2008).   
corporate penalties indeed have been sub-optimal during the last years and that competition authorities 
have to employ detection in addition to deterrence mechanisms  (Connor (2009) and Hüschelrath and 
Weigand (2010)).  
In Brazil, Cade (2016) published a study on the damages calculation in the cartel of peroxides. Using 
three different methodologies (time series, difference in differences and a structural model) and 
observed that damages and fines are very similar in value terms. However, considering the importance 
of the deterrence effect, either the amount of fines should be raised or the same amount should be 
claimed by the judiciary as a compensating effect. As this is not yet implemented in the Brazilian 
system, it should be considered as a public policy instrument. 
This work is divided in 6 parts, including this introduction: in session 2 I review the main 
characteristics of the cartel in Londrina, using information provided in the condemnation files; session 3 
describes the estimation methodology and presents some descriptive statistics available for the case; 
session 4 presents the main estimation results and the results of a general model of price effects in the 
ethanol, gasoline and diesel markets. Session 5 compares the results of estimated damages with the 
applied fines. I conclude in session 6, where I point out some outcomes that might be useful for future 
discussion of damage estimation and competition policy evaluation.   
  
II. The Cartel in Londrina Area 
A. Investigation and Prosecution 
In the 12th of August of 20076 , the Secretariat for Economic Defense (SDE)7 opened a cartel 
investigation after receiving a complaint from the State Policy of Parana informing about a criminal 
 
6 CADE has convicted 15 cartels involving fuel retailers up to 2015. Most of them relates to the price liberalization transition period (1999-2004) for 
which retailers price are not available (Cade (2014)).      
7 The competition system in Brazil was composed of 3 organizations until 2012: the Secretariat of Economic Monitoring (SEAE), attached to the 
Ministry of Finance, responsible for merger and acquisitions instructions; the Secretariat of Economic Law (SDE), attached to the Ministry of Justice, which 
investigation relating fuel retailers in in Londrina metropolitan area (Londrina, Cambe, Jataizinho and 
Ibipora cities). The State Policy private call interception of the fuel distributor Oil Petro revealed the 
existence of collusion in Londrina retail market. In August 29th, SDE, SEAE and the Parana policy 
deflagrated operation “Medusa III” initiating the execution of search warrants in 16 retailers located in 
the above mentioned neighbors municipalities8. 
Phone calls extracts and the questioning documents showed that collusion started when one of the 
retailers, located in a highway in the municipality of Cambe (“Posto Paizao” or Etiel Comercio de 
Combustiveis Ltda.), about 15 km from Londrina center, dropped ethanol price in the beginning of 2007. 
In response, one of its competitor (“Rede Posto Carajas” or Auto Posto Gasosan Ltda.), located 12.5 km 
from the center, also dropped its price, reaching the lowest level of R$0.94 per liter. This ‘price war’ 
started to attract drivers used to refuel in retailers located at Londrina city center, whose average price of 
ethanol ranged from R$1.39 to 1.74 per liter and average price for gasoline ranged from R$2.39 to 2.55 
per liter.  Figure 1 illustrates the geographical distribution of the investigated retailers, in red. Green dots 
marks the presence of family relatives in fuel retail management, who started the talks on the price war. 
Table 1 describes the linear and drive distances from colluders to the city center. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
instructed cases related to collusion and antitrust violation’s complaints; Council of Administrative Economic Defense (CADE), the Court who decided on 
merger consolidation and antitrust violations condemnations.   
8 Process number of reference 08012.0116681/2007-30. Public information disclosure at  
 Figure 1 
Condemned fuel retailers locations 
 
 
  
TABLE 1. LIST OF FUEL RETAILERS INVOLVED IN THE CARTEL AND DISTANCES  
Retailer Linear distance (km) Drive distance (km) Drive time (minutes) 
Auto Posto 10 de Dezembro Ltda. 1.5 2.7 7 
Kalahan Comercio de Combustiveis Ltda. 3.4 7.1 12 
Auto Posto Exposição Ltda. 4.6 5.1 10 
Etiel Comércio de Combustíveis Ltda. (Posto Paizão) 13.9 14.9 23 
A. A. Fevereiro, Doino e Machado Ltda. 2.1 3.4 8 
Auto Posto Paiaguás_Ltda. 2.6 3.8 7 
AVN Comercio de combustiveis Ltda-Me. 13.9 15.4 24 
C.O. Bolognesi & Bolognesi Ltda. (Posto Tropical) 1.0 2.1 5 
J Ramalho & Cia Ltda. (Auto Posto Versailles III) 10.9 11.6 19 
Posto Novo Oriente Ltda. 0.5 1.3 5 
Auto Posto Portelao Ltda. 10.6 11.6 19 
Source. Cade Administrative Process 08012.011588/2007-30; Google API  drive distance based on data for May 2017 from 8:30 am to 13:00 pm. I 
consider distance from Posto Transamerica, center located, as a benchmark. 
 
In April/May 2007, fuel retailer partners located in Londrina center started talking with owners of the 
two firms in Cambe to agree on an end of the ‘price war’, combining the amount of price increases, price 
fixing9 and dates for readjustments. Cartel leaders intervened together with Londrina’s retailers, 
forcing10 all associates to agree on price stabilization. Following CADE’s documentation, the price 
uniformization policy did not require large amount of efforts since the condemned retailers were 
allegedly used as price reference to other fuel retailers in the region. 
 
9 The agreement went up to the 2nd decimal level price combination in which some retailers could raise or drop their prices up to R$0,03, adjusting it to 
demand changes.  
10 The pressure involved physical threatening, verbal abuse and harassment of retailers. 
From the files, I observed that the cartel operated until the end of August 2007, when dawn raids and 
temporary arrest warrants were carried out. In the threats, fuel retailers decided that a “fair price” in 
Cambe would be R$1.18 to ethanol and R$2.32 to gasoline, while in Londrina these prices would be 
aligned at R$1.33 and R$2.43.   
These price differences between ethanol and gasoline are important to explain how apparently distant 
fuel retailers, i.e., non-competitors, suddenly became fiercely competitors and targets of other retailers. 
Ethanol is considered to be equal to gasoline when the per-liter price of the first reaches 70% of the per-
liter price of gasoline. Even if gasoline and ethanol are priced about equally in $per kilometer traveled, 
Salvo and Huse (2013) highlight there are consumer’s tastes over both fuels, such as consumers’ budget 
constraints (richer consumers prefer gasoline over ethanol), age and environment concerns, that might 
affect this substitutability.  
For instance, one consumer making the choice on gasoline or ethanol, considering only price 
preferences, facing the lower bound of R$2.39 per liter, would compare the profitability of buying 
ethanol only if its price were lower than R$1.68. However, it also needed to consider if this price was 
being offered by the same station or in the neighborhood, otherwise it would need to consider 
transportation costs. Using a vehicle with a performance of 10Km per liter in gasoline and 7km liter in 
ethanol, the 70% price difference would justify the choice of a 30km round trip to fill up a tank with 40 
liters of ethanol – an economy of almost 50%. In CADE’s documents, one retailer owner in the city 
center confirmed that sales dropped by 300-500 liters a day, not clarifying, however, if these drops are 
related to gasoline or ethanol.  
The cartel operated in two groups: the core one, coordinated by the Guarda family and two other price 
retailers, was responsible for determining and price monitoring. This involved the participation of a fuel 
distributor, Oil Petro, whose commercial manager, Mauro Guarda, kept vertical relations with one fuel 
retailer of the same name.  The second group involved main fuel retailers in the cities of Londrina and 
Cambe considered price makers because of their commercialized size. Cade’s documents show that 
these retailers accepted to participate in the agreement by changing their price in the date suggested by 
the core group, influencing the rest of fuel retailers to follow the leaders.       
Apart from penal prosecution, Cade deliberated on penalties which summed up more R$10 million 
(US$5million), according to Table 2. The amount of fines was ruled based on art. 37 and 45 of the 
National Antitrust Law 12.529/2011 which can range from 0.1% to 20% from the total firm revenue. 
According to the Commissioner’s11, her decision of fixing a 13%-15% rate was based on the direct and 
indirect participation of the defendants. Although the law explicitly affirms that imposed fines should 
not be lesser than illegal profits, estimation difficulties impede Cade to proceed with this ruling more 
frequently.   
 
  
 
11 Frazao(2013). Decision in the Process 08012.011668/2007-30, vol. 8.  
TABLE 2. LIST OF CONDEMNED FUEL RETAILERS AND MANAGERS 
Fines (R$) 
1. AVN Comércio de Combustíveis Ltda. (Auto Posto Bonanza)                          610 314.46    
2. Mazzarelo & Cia Ltda. (Auto Posto Flamboyant)                          851 280.00    
3. Oíl Petro Brasileira de Petróleo Ltda.                          851 280.00    
4. DGJR Comércio de Combustíveis Ltda. (Posto Versailles e Posto Versailles II)                          851 280.00    
S. J Ramalho & Cia Ltda. (Auto Posto Versailles III)                          851 280.00    
6. Auto Posto 10 de Dezembro Ltda.                          851 280.00    
7. Posto_ Novo _Oriente Ltda.                          851 280.00    
8. C.O. Bolognesi & Bolognesi Ltda. (Posto Tropical)                          851 280.00    
9. Auto Posto Paiaguás_Ltda.                          487 134.86    
10. Etiel Comércio de Combustíveis Ltda. (Posto Paizão)                          744 870.00    
11. Auto Posto Brasília de Londrina Ltda (Posto Meninão)                          744 870.00    
12. Auto Posto Exposição Ltda.                          744 870.00    
1. Mauro Cesar Guarda                          255 384.00    
2. Jonatas Cerqueira Guarda                          127 692.00    
3. Claudir_Osmir Bolognesi                          255 384.00    
4. Itauby Netto José Ramalho                          255 384.00    
5. Djalma Eugênio Guarda                          346 931.17    
6. Djalma Eugênio Guarda Júnior                            79 340.88    
7. Sergio Goes_de_Oliveira                          290 499.30    
8. Edson Fernandes Gimenes                            63 327.53    
TOTAL                    10 964 962.20    
Source. Cade Administrative Process 08012.011588/2007-30 
 
III. Estimation strategy 
A.Methodology 
In order to define the illegal profits and the damages of the cartel, I used Cade’s information to define 
the duration of the cartel, from May to August 2007. Quantifying damages involves estimating the price 
that would have occurred absent the cartel during the period of the cartel. For that, I need to characterize 
the market conditions for ethanol and gasoline demand in Londrina.   
I start with a standard oligopoly model of competition that incorporates price discrimination over fuels 
and stations characteristics. As from obtained in cartel documents, retailers set they prices differently 
from which other, based on location and demand flow. These characteristics were observed even during 
the cartel period when they set prices differences up to the third decimal level. Considering that retailers 
operate in ethanol and gasoline, the individual firm profit function is: 
(1) ߨ݆ ൌ ቀ݌݃ െ ݓ݃ െ ܿ݃ቁ ݏ݃ ൅ ൫݌݁ െ ݓ݁ െ ܿ݁൯ݏ݁ 
Where݌݃, ݌݁ are the respective prices for gasoline and ethanol, ݓ݃, ݓ݁ are their respective wholesale 
paid price,  ܿ݃, ܿ݁ the retailer’s constant marginal cost of distribution for each fuel. Fuels specific market 
shares are given by ݏ݃, ݏ݁. Cost shifters are such as the wholesale price, distance to city center, number of 
pumps and tankage size. 
Assuming the existence of pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, the price for each fuel must 
satisfy the following first order conditions: 
(2) ݏ݃ ൅ ቀ݌݃ െ ݓ݃ െ ܿ݃ቁ ߲ݏ߲݃݌݃ ൌ 0 
(3) ݏ݁ ൅ ൫݌݁ െ ݓ݁ െ ܿ݁൯ ߲ݏ߲݁݌݁ ൌ 0 
Equations (2), (3) imply that the vector ߛof retailer’s margins is the retail price ݌ minus the wholesale 
price ݓ minus the marginal cost of distribution	ܿ: 
(4) ߛ ൌ ݌ െ ݓ െ ܿ 
Price-cost margins estimations require the observation of the demand shape to infer firm’s margins. 
Anderson (2012) develops a model of demand for ethanol as a gasoline substitute where the household 
will choose the fuel with the lower ethanol-equivalent price. Aggregate demand for both gasoline and 
ethanol will be a smooth function of relative prices when fuel-switching price ratios are distributed 
continuously. The log-linear aggregated demand equations for gasoline and ethanol are therefore: 
(5) ݈݊ܳ௚௜௧ ൌ∝௚൅ ߚ଴݈݊ܿܽݎݏ௧ െ ߚଵ݈݊݌௚௜௧ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊݌௘௜௧ െ ߚௗ݈݊ݐ݅݉݁ݐݎܽݒ݈݁௜௡ ൅ ε௜௝ 
(6) ݈݊ܳ௘௜௧ ൌ∝௘൅ ߚଷ݈݊ܿܽݎݏ௧ െ ߚସ݈݊݌௘௜௧ ൅ ߚଶ݈݊݌௚௜௧ െ ߚௗ݈݊ݐ݅݉݁ݐݎܽݒ݈݁௜௡ ൅ ε௜௝ 
Where ܳ௚௜௧, ݈݊ܳ௘௜௧ are both quantities of gasoline and ethanol sold by each station i in time t, ݌௚௝ ݌௘௝ are 
the retailers price for gasoline and ethanol, timetravel12 captures the travel time period between i and n, 
the cartel leader in city center, ε is an index of unobserved station attributes. I will test whether travel 
distance from the city center to retailers located elsewhere may affect demand preferences as pointed out 
by Houde (2012).  
Reduced form demand estimation equations for gasoline and ethanol prices in a panel for i retailers in 
time t are such as: 
(7) ݌௚௜௧ ൌ∝0൅ ߚ1݌݁݅ݐ ൅ ߚ2ݐ݅݉݁ݐݎܽݒ݈݆݁݊ ൅ ߚ3ݓ௚ ൅ ߚସܿ௚ ൅ ݆߳݅ 
(8) ݌௘௝௧ ൌ∝5൅ ߚ6݌௚௜௧ ൅ ߚ7ݐ݅݉݁ݐݎܽݒ݈݆݁݊ ൅ ߚ8ݓ௘ ൅ ߚଽܿ௘ ൅ ݆߳݅ 
Where ݓ are costs related to the wholesale distributors and to other cost shifters such as information 
on tankage size and if the retailer is unbranded. Once estimated parameters for each fuel I can include a 
dummy for the firms involved in the cartel during that specific time and use a linear estimator with 
random effects such as:  
(9) ݌௚௜௧ ൌ∝0൅ ߚ1݌݁݅ݐ ൅ ߚ2ݐ݅݉݁ݐݎܽݒ݈݆݁݊ ൅ ߚ3ݓ௚ ൅ ߚସܿ௚ ൅ ߮݁ݐܽ݀ܿܽݎݐ݈݁ܫܦ݃ ൅ ݆߳݅ 
(10) ݌௘௝௧ ൌ∝5൅ ߚ6݌௚௜௧ ൅ ߚ7ݐ݅݉݁ݐݎܽݒ݈݆݁݊ ൅ ߚ8ݓ௘ ൅ ߚଽܿ௘ ൅ ߮݃ܽݏ݀ܿܽݎݐ݈݁ܫܦ݁ ൅ ݆߳݅ 
For the structural model, I estimate equations (5) and (6) using cost information such as the wholesale 
prices and tankage as instruments. I also include the average price for the 1km competitors’ on gasoline 
and ethanol to control for price changes not related to the sold quantity. With the estimated elasticities, I 
can simulate the “but for price” for each retailer considering its individual mark-up rules and wholesale 
costs. 
 
12 Data collect on May 13, 2017 from 8:30 pm to 14pm, local time of Londrina. 
B. Database and Statistics 
I used information in the file process to characterize cartelists and the cartel period. In addition, I 
aggregated 3 databases with information regarding fuel retailers in Londrina and Cambe13 obtained from 
Brazilian Fuel Regulator (Agencia Nacional do Petroleo, Gas Natural - ANP): (1) an unbalanced weekly 
panel of retailers and wholesale prices for diesel, gasoline and ethanol from 2007 to 2009, including 
brand characteristics and georeferenced locations; (2) a monthly panel of retailers acquired quantities of 
diesel, gasoline and ethanol also spanning from 2007 to 2009; (3) a cross section of retailers 
characteristics such as numbers of pumps and tankage. Since this last makes reference to retailers in 
2014 I also cross checked for information in ANP website14 regarding retailers who are no longer in 
operation but whose characteristics are still available.  
I obtained travel and time distances using Google API for each station regarding one fuel retailer 
located at city center but not cited in the files15. I also added information regarding regional inflation rate 
for the period and control variables such as total number of passenger’s cars. The sample includes prices 
and quantities for the sale of gasoline, ethanol and diesel in 154 fuel retailers in Londrina for a period of 
36 months (3 years), totalizing 5,544 observations. Considering missing price data, however, I have only 
443 completed information for gasoline and 440 completed information for ethanol. 
For inflation, I consider the State of Parana index for Consumer Price (IPCA) provided by the 
Brazilian Institute of Statistics (IBGE). Other general price cost shifters, such as the international sugar 
price and petrol were obtained through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) statistics. Licensed 
vehicles in the city of Londrina and Cambe were provided by the Parana State Department for Traffic 
Control (Detran/PR).     
 
13 ANP price collection methodology does not include n Ibipora or Jataizinho due to its sample size. Price and quantity information for each gas station 
are not available in the disclosured process files.   
14 http://www.anp.gov.br/postos/consulta.asp 
15 Posto Transamerica, cnpj 07.775.477/0001-98. 
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the key variables. On average, fuel retailers in Londrina sold about 75,000 
liters of gasoline, 50,000 liters of ethanol and 76,000 of diesel per month. However, these volumes 
changed along the years, remarked in 2009 when there was a 20% rise in the commercialization of 
ethanol and 18% of diesel compared to 2007. 
 
  
TABLE 3. SUMMARY STATISTICS ON VOLUMES 
Overall 2007 2008 2009 
Quantities 
(liter/month) 
Mean SD # Mean SD # Mean SD # Mean SD # 
Gasoline 74,914 54,056 157 76,680 51,187 127 74,914 54,056 157 68,599 53,176 130 
Ethanol 49,790 45,410 160 33,246 29,923 132 49,790 45,410 160 56,655 50,565 131 
Diesel 76,271 13,3078 154 71,456 15,108 118 76,271 13,307 154 89,905 12,996 130 
Source: own calculations. 
 
The summary quantities statistics also highlight the amount of heterogeneity across stations in 
Londrina between 2007 and 2009. Gasoline had the highest standard deviations compared to the 
commercialization of diesel, for instance. But the commercialization of ethanol got increasingly 
dispersed along the years - standard deviation went from 30,000 liters in 2007 to 50,500 liters in 2009. 
This heterogeneity is also caught by characteristics such as number of pumps and tanks. Overall, 
stations have more variation regarding the number of gasoline pumps and less for diesel, despite these 
last vary more in terms of tankage. Stations prosecuted for collusion, however, had more similar 
characteristics in terms of number of pumps of gasoline and ethanol, corroborating the information 
available in Cade’s files regarding the collusion in these two markets.  On average, cartelists had 3 
gasoline pumps 3 pumps for ethanol while stores outside the cartel had 6 pumps for gasoline and 4 for 
ethanol. However, they had more pumps for diesel, reflecting the agreement choice for retailers located 
in the highway and used to have more clients for diesel. Stores in the cartel were also slightly 
geographically more spread in the same comparison as shown in Table 4. 
 
TABLE 4. SUMMARY STATISTICS ON PRICES AND CHARACTERISTICS 
Overall In collusion Not in collusion 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Gasoline price (R$/Lt) 2.451 0.099 2.370 0.071 2.451 0.099 
Ethanol price (R$/Lt) 1.466 0.206 1.192 0.122 1.468 0.205 
Diesel price (R$/Lt) 1.914 0.088 1.767 0.041 1.916 0.087 
Pumps gas 5.047 3.056 3.857 2.762 5.055 3.057 
Pumps ethanol 3.506 1.938 3.000 1.342 3.509 1.941 
Pumps diesel 2.659 2.156 3.571 2.891 2.653 2.150 
Tanks gasoline (liter) 32.118 12.473 25.000 10.607 32.167 12.472 
Tanks ethanol (liter) 22.412 10.783 19.286 6.944 22.433 10.803 
Tanks disel (liter) 24.529 20.463 28.571 13.887 24.501 20.500 
Distance (Km) 5.538 5.233 6.455 4.977 5.532 5.235 
Drive distance (minutes) 10.859 6.591 11.636 6.823 10.854 6.590 
Source: own calculations. 
 
In terms of price, the overall price per liter for gasoline was R$2.45 (US$1.22) with a dispersion of 
0.09 cents. During the cartel, colluding firms presented lower average gasoline price than non-colluding 
ones (0.08 cents difference); nevertheless, colluders presented lower dispersion. Similar patterns can be 
seen for ethanol and diesel prices: despite cartelists ethanol and diesel prices were about R$0.27 and 
R$0.15 lower than non-cartelists, their variation across stations was much lower. The fact that these fuel 
stations were located far from the city center explains the lower average price. In addition, as 
documented in the files, cartelists have greater tankage in diesel, being an important part of total 
revenue.  
One of the most important changes in the operations of the fuels market in Brazil concerns its business 
model. Until 1997, service stations were necessarily tied to distributors and carried their brands, acting 
in the market as franchise units. Thus, transactions between distributors and service stations occurred 
through loyalty contracts and negotiation exclusivity. Since deregulation, a new model has allowed the 
establishment of stations without supply contracts with a distributor. These are dubbed “unbranded” or 
“white flag” service stations, insofar as they are not franchises of any distributors. Most retailers in 
Londrina region declared themselves as white flags, as it is shown in Table 5. Retailers involved in the 
cartel were a majority of unbranded retailers (54%), which also helps to understand the lower price 
differences and the role of Oil Petrol, the regional distributor, as one of the leaders of the cartel.  
 IV. Estimation Results 
A. Gasoline 
As the cartel period and colluding firms are already known, reduced form estimations can help to give 
a glimpse on how much price were affected. Gasoline and ethanol prices are explained by costs and 
demand shifters such as distance (time to travel from the city center of Londrina to each retailer, 
including those in Cambe), if the store is not branded, tankage and number of pumps. I did not consider 
costs related to the commercialization of other fuels because 90% of total stations traded both of them.  
For gasoline, I tested different specifications where the most robust includes retailer price information 
for ethanol. This is not a novelty in the Brazilian market because of fuels substitutability. Ethanol 
retailer price’s (“PRECOVENDAETANOLd”) augmentation in 1 Real would cause an average rise of 
0.089 cents in gasoline retailer’s price.16. 
Time to travel (“time”) and travel distance to travel (“dist”) seemed to be correlated, so I dropped one 
of them in the final specification. Travel distance from the city center presented the negative expected 
signs, though the magnitude of the impact was not very high: for each kilometer, there was a drop lower 
than one cent of Real. Here I needed more information on commuting choices to better observe 
consumer’s choice. 
Acquisition price from distributors (“PRECOCOMPRAGASd”) represented the highest and most 
straightforward impacts on retailer’s prices: 1 Real of price increase from distributors had a direct pass-
through effect over retailer’s prices, ranging from 1.04 to 1.05 price augmentation at the pump. On the 
other hand, the choice of being an unbranded store (“d_branca”) did not seem to have much impact on 
retailers’ prices, which might indicate that a tacit collusion behavior was already in place in both 
 
16Nearly 50% of the vehicles in the State of Parana had the flex-fuel technology already in place. (Ministry of Environment (2011). Graphic 70, page 90).  
municipalities. Storage capacity (“tanks_gas”) is correlated with lower prices, as it was expected from 
literature; these effects, however, were strikingly lower compared to the positive coefficients of price 
increase, which might reflects managers’ capacity to avoid extra costs. 
During the cartel, the price of the firms involved in collusion was 0.13 cents higher than other periods, 
including before and after the cartel. I cannot assume this as a direct effect of the cartel though since 
there are also effects associated with the cross price elasticity for the consumption of ethanol.  
  
TABLE 5. REDUCED PRICE DEMAND REGRESSIONS FOR GASOLINE 
Specification 1 2 3 4 
Dependent: retail price of gasoline 
Demand factors 
0.1096105 0.1036447 0.0931006 0.043569 
(0.043469) (0.0386335) (0.0386833) (0.0151887) 
-0.0171896 -0.017215 -0.0170129 -0.002309 
(0.0063476) (0.0062115) (0.0061915) (0.0008059) 
0.00895 0.0090318     
(0.0050273) (0.0049132)     
Cost factors     
1.053047 1.052917 1.049946 1.047202 
(0.0205515) (0.0205155) (0.0204499) (0.0177587) 
-0.0084004       
(0.0227797)       
0.0897138 0.0896416 0.0980785 0.0937471 
(0.0288679) 
 (0.0287533) (0.0269798) (0.0286924) 
  
-0.0023663 
 
-0.0022545 -0.0019947 -0.0014993 
 (0.0009149) 
 (0.0008318) (0.0008364) (0.0008217) 
Collusion         
     0.1384666 0.1392501 
     (0.0629351) (0.0631914) 
sigma_u 0.03668116 0.03356806  0.01212934 0.04053157 
sigma_e 0.10310978 0.10473205  0.04987219 0.10356332 
rho 0.11233969 0.09315895  0.05584701 0.13282551 
R-squared (overall) 0.9989 0.999 0.999 0.9991 
Standard errors in (). Results at specifications 3 and 4 are significant at 1%. Source: own calculations. 
 
For the structural demand estimation, I regressed equation (5) using as instruments the information on 
wholesale costs per retailer, the size of tankage and the average price of neighboring retailers in a 1 km 
ray. Price effects on quantities have the expected signs and it confirms the low price elasticity for 
gasoline in the region: a 1% price raise drops the demanded quantity less than 0.6%. The effect of a 
price raise in ethanol increases the demand for gasoline also around 0.6%.    
TABLE 6. DEMAND ESTIMATION FOR GASOLINE 
Specification 1 2 3 
Dependent: logarithm of gasoline quantity 
25.55381 26.94924 26.84867 
(6.698227) (6.828287) (6.840229) 
-0.4547253 -0.5590767 -0.5734533 
(0.3077597) (0.3060727) (0.3066743) 
0.5183416 0.5999931 0.6123401 
(0.2816827) (0.2788484) (0.2793655) 
-1.182731 -1.291657 -1.303361 
(0.5447383) (0.5551726) (0.5559122) 
    0.1144555 
    (0.1375862) 
sigma_u 0.63035553 0.60124663 0.6053546 
sigma_e 0.21563805 0.18700162 0.18835183 
rho 0.89523489 0.91179696 0.91173498 
Standard errors in (). 1. Instruments: lpm_conc_1km lprecocompragas; 2.  lpm_conc_1km lprecocompragas  ltanksg; 3. lpm_conc_1km  lprecocompragas  
ltanksg. Source: own calculations. 
 
 
Overcharges can be calculated supposing the “but for price” is a result of a monopolistic competition 
in which retailers add a markup rule to wholesale costs, given its share: 
(11) ݌௕௨௧௣௥௜௖௘௜௧ ൌ ܿ݋ݏݐݏ௚௜௧ ൅ ቀെ ௦ఌቁ 
Overcharges in the structural model are also positive and significant, in average R$0.38 cents higher 
(9.8% overcharge, against 4.7% overcharge in the reduced form). Figure 1 next compares both estimated 
but for prices with the actual price charged by retailers.   
 
 
FIGURE 1. GASOLINE ACTUAL SOLD PRICES AND ESTIMATED COMPETING PRICES  
 
Source: own calculations. 
 
B. Ethanol 
In the ethanol price specifications I included both the same demand variables as in gasoline (“dist” and 
“time”). For cost shifters, I also included the acquisition price of ethanol from distributors 
(“PRECOCOMPRAETANOLd”) as well as the gasoline substitute effects (“PRECOVENDAGASd”). 
The main difference is the inclusion of the index of the international sugar price (“sugar”) to the analysis 
since the same cane is used for sugar or ethanol production. In Brazil, producers have a flexibility to 
switch between sugar and ethanol and the use of cane was about 50% to 50% until 2006. From then, 
industry growth switched to ethanol due to an increasing number of FFV vehicles and an increased 
demand for fuel ethanol. However, producer’s decisions on the supply of ethanol are highly dependent 
on the future prospective price for sugar. For instance, sugar mix was maximized in 2011 and 2012 due 
to high global sugar prices, leading to a lower supply of ethanol17.  
The impact of sugar prices on retailers’ was positive and significant in specifications 3 and 4. 
Although in specification 1 the sign was negative, this one did include extra variables that I dropped in 
 
17 Covrig (2014). 
other regressions due to lower explanatory power, such as time and distance. As in the gasoline 
regressions, travel distance had a negative effect on ethanol’s price but with the same low magnitude 
impact.  
Information on the unbranded store (“d_branca”) also did not bring information on prices, so I 
dropped in the last specifications, as well as the information on the number of ethanol pumps 
(“bicos_eta”). 
Acquisition price from distributors (“PRECOCOMPRAETANOLd”) also did seem to have a direct 
effect on retailers’ prices, though in a much smaller magnitude than gasoline costs pass-through. This 
might be a reflex of consumer’s preferences for the later and firms’ ability to absorb some of the costs in 
order to avoid excessive stocks for the product. Gasoline retail price augmentation 
(“PRECOVENDAGASd”), on the other hand, had a higher pass-through on ethanol’s price than the 
effect of the ethanol price on gasoline. This shows that retailers pricing strategies consider not only 
costs, but also demand preferences and substitution. A higher gasoline retail price allows firms to raise 
more ethanol’s price than the opposite, respecting the fuel efficiency thumb rule of 70% of 
ethanol/gasoline.      
During collusion, ethanol prices were 0.038 cents lower than prices out of that period. Although this 
might seem controversial, it may reflect firms pricing strategy to keep gasoline and ethanol prices 
balanced and to keep a stable revenue for colluders. Remembering that the cartel started after a “price 
war” in the ethanol market in which the revenue of competitors firms was lowering because of 
consumers’ gasoline substitution. By lowering ethanol prices to a certain level, cartelists kept the 
amount of gasoline and ethanol sales.          
 
  
  TABLE 7. REDUCED PRICE DEMAND REGRESSIONS FOR ETHANOL 
Specification 1 2 3 4 
Dependent: retail price of ethanol 
Demand factors 
0.2293977 -0.6820153 -0.7618369 -0.7903439 
(0.1088252) (0.1000504) (0.0948181) (0.0952531) 
0.0030712 0.0105773   -0.0050015 
(0.0134118) (0.0080061)   (0.0023574) 
-0.0052832 -0.013321 -0.0053529   
(0.0110065) (0.006522) (0.0018683)   
Cost factors         
1.161412 0.4200158 0.3800242 0.3804374 
(0.0207021) (0.0603231) (0.0548631) (0.0564332) 
0.1917472 0.048704     
(0.0469142) (0.0323915)     
  0.4033752 0.4252455 0.4249725 
  (0.0317775) (0.0290005) (0.0298097) 
-0.0032696 -0.0022551 -0.002262 -0.0025557 
(0.0020202) (0.001217) (0.0011911) (0.0012002) 
-0.0049045 0.0535773 0.0575578 0.0578314 
0.0066979 0.0064634 0.0059689 0.0060654 
Collusion         
      -0.0382886 
      (0.1550836) 
sigma_u 0.08968003 0.00690577 0 0 
sigma_e 0.18962417 0.13691181 0.14413066 0.14483054 
rho 0.18278497 0.00253769 0 0 
R-squared (overall) 0.9846 0.9899 0.9932 0.9932 
Standard errorsin (). Results are significant at 1%. Source: own calculations. 
 
 
Price elasticity for ethanol was quite similar to the one obtained for gasoline, showing that the 
products are perceived as substitutes (-0.57and -0.55). In both gasoline and ethanol estimations, travel 
distance was associated with a positive effect on quantities. Since I do not information on commuters, it 
is inconclusive whether there is larger demand for retailers located outside of the city center, as it might 
indicate.  
 
  
 TABLE 8. DEMAND ESTIMATION FOR ETHANOL 
Specification 1 2 3 
Dependent: logarithm of ethanol quantity 
-40.45567 -43.16309 -40.73871 
(13.92972) (17.50656) (13.93184) 
0.6206255 1.105276 0.6165984 
(0.6998246) (0.8535769) (0.7000006) 
-0.5546346 -1.022595 -0.5548431 
(0.6414875) (0.7785791) (0.6415611) 
4.206299 4.40747 4.205395 
(1.129817) (1.419404) (1.129979) 
    0.1383563 
    (0.1556563) 
sigma_u 0.6769464 0.65156218 0.68346768 
sigma_e 0.41989428 0.45186623 0.42284094 
rho 0.72215537 0.67523815 0.72319519 
Standard errors in (). 1. Instruments: lpm_conc_1km lprecocompragas; 2. lpm_conc_1km lprecocompragas  ltanksg; 3. lpm_conc_1km  lprecocompragas  
ltanksg. Source: own calculations. 
 
 
Using the structural demand, calculated overcharges were of R$0.38 cents for ethanol (16% over 
estimated prices), against the price reduction observed in the reduced form. This impacts damages 
estimation and fines calibration, as I show in the next session.  
 FIGURE 2. ETHANOL ACTUAL SOLD PRICES AND ESTIMATED COMPETING PRICES 
  
Source: own calculations. 
 
V. Evaluating Competition Policy: Fines x Estimated Damages 
In order to calculate estimated damages with the results from the reduced and structural approaches, I 
must consider the net cross effects of the coefficients of both gasoline and ethanol retailers’ price in 
which other. For instance, one Real increase in ethanol price was related to R$0.0937471 cents rise in 
the gasoline price. Considering the hypothesis that colluders dropped ethanol price by -0.0382886, 
keeping the same proportionality, it is equivalent to assume that the net gasoline price augmentation was 
of R$0.135. For ethanol, it was about R$0.02.  
Worth to say that price overcharges were in line with the observed in refereed literature, such as in 
Connor and Bolotova (2006). There are studies about overcharge proportion being related to 
oligopolistic environments and higher barriers to entry18. As fuel retail is neither one of them, lower 
cartel overcharge is expected. This finding also reflects colluder’s preoccupation in setting the “right” 
price for which retailer considering differences up to the third decimal level19.      
 
TABLE 7. OVERCHARGES ESTIMATIONS IN THE REDUCED FORM (R$) 
Cartel Overcharge  
(“dummyidcartel”) 
Cross price coefficients 
 
Price effect 
 
Net effect 
 
But for prices 
(average) 
Net Overcharge 
Gasoline  0.139 0.093 -0.003 0.135 3.798 4.61% 
Ethanol -0.038 0.424 0.059 0.020 2.430 -3.21% 
Source: own calculations. 
 
TABLE 8. OVERCHARGES ESTIMATIONS USING STRUCTURAL FORM (R$) 
Cartel excessive price  
Without cross effects 
Overcharges  
Without cross effects 
But for prices  
Without cross effects  
But for prices 
(average) 
Net Overcharge 
Gasoline  0.389 9.849% 3.537  3.658 6.68% 
Ethanol 0.382 16.325% 1.957  2.028 12.5% 
Source: own calculations. 
 
To calculate the damages, one must consider the total quantity sold by each firm at the period; 
however, this information is not available for all the firms in collusion which might lead to 
 
18 Bolotova et al (2008) have a nice overcharge/industry characteristic correlation analysis.  
19 In one of the dialogues between Djalma Guarda Junior and Djalma Guarda, both son and father, the first insists to correct that agreed ethanol price was 
1.269, not 1.259, as the father believed.  
underestimated effect. Considering that involved retailers were also price leaders, regulating prices 
setting in the city, I estimate damages considering total volume sold both in the gasoline and ethanol 
markets during the cartel period. Calculated damages considering reduced and structural estimations and 
its cross effects are reported in Table 9. Results from the last form show a higher damage than the 
reduced form. Total amount of damages were not very high especially because of the low duration of the 
cartel (3 months). 
 
TABLE 9. DAMAGES ESTIMATIONS (R$) 
 Reduced form Structural form Total quantities sold 
in the period 
Estimated Damages 
Gasoline 
134,515.8 457,936 131,048.3 295,352.8 
Ethanol                                    
-10,644.23 117,001.2 -15,167.73 92,648.25 
Total 
123, 871.57 574, 937.20 115, 880.57 388, 001.05 
Source: own calculations. 
 
The amount of Cade’s fine summed up R$10,964,962.2. This is 20 times higher than the highest 
estimated damages. Optimal deterrence theory states claims that fines should be inversely proportional 
to the probability of being discovered in crime. If firms exclusively think about collusion as an economic 
decision to increase profits and refrain from ethical principles, the question to be answered is whether 
the gain from price fixing outweighs expected punishments.  Probability of detection is very difficult to 
assess, although some studies had tried that. The research of Allain et al (2013) reviews the main papers 
that tried to assess these probabilities, ranging from 10% to 33%, consistent with the probability of 
detection for other crimes. Using this information to evaluate applied fines, I observe that Cade’s policy 
choice in the case seemed to be higher with the expected deterrence effect, considering damages, dawn 
raid costs and the probability of being caught. However, Cade’s policy reflected a deterrence effect of 
5%, which may be considered a more realistic to the authority’s capacity of cartel detection, given the 
proportionality of the authority to the country dimensions.  
  
 
TABLE 9. FINES (PUNISHMENT) CONSIDERING THE PROBABILITY OF DETECTION 
Probability of being caught Penalty1 Penalty2 Penalty3 Penalty4 
0.05     2 477 431.40        11 498 744.00        2 317 611.40        7 760 021.00    
0.1     1 238 715.70          5 749 372.00        1 158 805.70        3 880 010.50    
0.15        825 810.47          3 832 914.67           772 537.13        2 586 673.67    
0.3        412 905.23          1 916 457.33           386 268.57        1 293 336.83    
Source: own calculations. 
 
VI. Final Considerations 
The necessity to evaluate public policies is an important issue to justify the amount of investment 
done in one matter. The analysis of cartel punishment effects is one way to verify how Competition 
Authorities are currently dealing with such crimes, considering that they are hard to detect and that 
investigations require financial and human resources expenses. The above analysis is a first insight to 
provide a view of how appropriate are the actual fine decisions done by the Brazilian Competition 
Authority.  
Under Brazil’s current competition law, cartel fines may vary from 0.1 to 20 percent of the 
companies’ revenue from the year before the conduct began. The law also says fines should never be 
lower than the benefits companies received from the conduct — when it is possible to calculate such 
benefits. However, these calculations are not straightforward; so, more time should be given to the 
evaluation of past condemned cartels fines considering the estimated damages. So far, this is the second 
study on cartel damages done in Brazil. Considering that the first study did not point to any deterrence 
effects of the applied policy, the estimations presented above do show that applied fines ended up 
considering it. The results here obtained may also help the Authority in the dosimeter fines calculations, 
which may have to consider not only the gravity of the conduct, but the industry characteristics. 
Industries with lower participants may be object of higher fines than colluding firms in a more 
oligopolistic environment.  
In addition to competition policy debate, this paper also contributed to the fuel substitutability debate. 
Ethanol is perceived as a perfect substitute for gasoline. Subsidies for the promotion of this fuel as a 
more ecological friendly fuel might not achieve the wanted substitution effect if firms pricing strategy 
consider the ethanol equivalent fuel price in gasoline.    
Future work though must consider a different specification of the demand choices for retailers, 
especially considering that neighbor’s stores must have a greater impact on prices than distant ones. The 
demand characterization for both fuels (gasoline and ethanol) might allow a better assessment over the 
price cost margins through a structural simulation using the hypothesis that stations choices are 
differentiated goods. 
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